The wait time for a Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) award varies from a few months to a several years. Little is known about how applicants fund their consumption during this waiting time, while they receive no income support or medical benefits from the SSDI program. Using the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) linked to the Social Security Administration's 831 file, this paper is the first to identify the causal effect of a longer waiting time on the use of these coping strategies using an instrumental variable (IV) approach.
Introduction
A disabled worker seeking Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits must first undergo a multi-layered and potentially lengthy disability determination process. Approximately one-third of SSDI applicants are awarded benefits during the first stage of the application process, with an average processing time of 4.3 months; for those few who appeal all the way through to the deferral courts, the average processing time is 57 months (Autor and Duggan 2010) . During the application and appeals processes, SSDI applicants receive no income support or medical benefits from the SSDI program. However, they face strong incentives to remain out of the labor force because evidence of gainful employment would disqualify their application. 1
While considerable attention has been paid to how applicants fill the health insurance coverage gap, much less is known about how disabled individuals fund their consumption during the application process. Two notable exceptions include Bound, Burkhauser, and Nichols (2003) and Honeycutt (2004) . They find that income from government transfers and temporary disability insurance programs partially offset the decline in SSDI applicants' own labor earnings.
However, while the wait time for SSDI has drawn increased attention from research and the policy-making arenas, the relationship between waiting time and how individuals fund consumption remains unexplored. (SIPP) linked to the SSA's 831 file, this paper is the first to examine the causal relationship between the waiting time and various coping strategies of applicants for SSDI. Our analysis starts with documenting the evolution of applicants' income and sources of income, before SSDI application, during application, and after the final SSDI determination. The study focuses on five types of coping strategies that applicants may rely on, including: (1) government transfers: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP); Workers' Compensation; and Unemployment Insurance (UI), 2 (2) earnings of the spouse, (3) changing living arrangements, (4) borrowing from credit, and (5) liquidation of housing assets. 3 1 Gainful employment is defined here as earning over the Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) amount, or more than $1,010 ($1,690) a month for non-blind (blind) disability beneficiaries in 2012. 2 Supplementary Security Income program cannot be considered as a coping strategy during the application determination process because SSI applications are processed like DI applications. Temporary Disability Insurance is also excluded from the analysis because there is no information from the SIPP on receiving TDI benefits.
Using the 1990 to 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation
We then examine how wait time is associated with the use of each coping strategy in the initial month of application and the average use of each coping strategy over the duration of the application. We also investigate how the use of each coping strategy changes with time since application, controlling for the overall application duration. While this estimation strategy addresses some endogeneity concerns, any relationship between the time since application and the increased or decreased use of a coping strategy could be due to applicants reacting to a longer waiting time or due to some applicants using the coping strategy to fund a longer waiting time by appealing an initial denial. To separate these two effects, we employ an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach, using average waiting by state-year-stage to instrument for the actual waiting time, to identify the effect of an exogenous increase in the waiting time on the use of each coping strategy. 4 The findings can be summarized as follows. First, while the relationship between the wait time and the use of any particular coping strategy, during the initial month or on average over the spell, is largely absent, we find that applicants with an exogenously longer waiting durations are more likely to use SNAP benefits both initially and on average, and less likely to change one's address over the duration of the application. Moreover, an increase in the waiting time reduces the probability that applicants receive UI benefits, likely because these benefits cease after several months. Finally, we find a positive relationship between the time since application and spousal employment in the reduced form but no such relationship for our IV regressions. Together, these results suggests that applicants' spouses do not react to an exogenous increase in the waiting time by working more, but that a working spouse makes it more likely that applicants extend the waiting time by appealing an initial denial.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines SSDI and reviews the existing literature. Section 3 describes the data and sample construction and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 provides an overview of coping strategies and the determination of eligibility and take-up for each strategy. Section 5 describes how the wait time is correlated with demographic characteristics, coping strategies used at the time of application and over time as application progresses. Section 6 discusses the econometric approach and section 7 summarizes the main results, followed by concluding remarks in Section 8.
Background
Social Security Disability Insurance. SSDI is a social insurance program that provides cash benefits to workers who face a work-limiting disability expected to last at least 12 months.
Individuals must have worked long enough and recently enough to be SSDI-insured; that is, one must have worked an age-specific number of quarters and have worked 20 quarters in the last 10 years.
5 SSDI-insured individuals are eligible for SSDI benefits if they are not currently earning more than the Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) level due to a disability and are expected to be unable to do so for at least a year. SSDI benefits are a function of an individual's past labor earnings, using the same formula as Social Security retirement benefits, without an actuarial adjustment for early receipt of benefits. Disabled individuals who do not medically recover will get their full Social Security retirement benefit in perpetuity, as if they had retired at their Full Retirement Age. (French and Song 2009) . Rejected applicants can then appeal to the central Appeals Board of Washington and finally to a federal court. Because of the relatively low initial allowance rate and these lengthy appeals processes, the mean determination time for allowed applicants significantly exceeds that of denied applicants (Autor et al. 2011). 5 In order to be covered by SSDI, one must have worked a minimum of 40 or (age-21) quarters overall and have earned half the credits in the last five years or since turning 21. While the rules always refer to "covered quarters," it has been a misnomer since 1978. Covered quarters are calculated by the amount one makes in a calendar year, not the amount of time one was employed. In 2012, earnings of $1,130 are required to earn one quarter of coverage. 6 Individuals may be terminated from the disability program due to medical recovery or by earnings that exceed the SGA under certain conditions. "Medical recovery" is determined through continuing disability reviews (CDRs), whose use has varied widely over time. Stapleton et al. (2010) find that only 4 percent of 1996 SSDI awardees had their benefits terminated for work in the first ten years in the program. Coe and Rupp (2013) find that approximately 1 percent of SSDI beneficiaries leave the rolls per year either due to work effort or medical recovery. 7 Exceptions to rotational assignment include high-priority cases flagged as potential terminal illness cases.
Hence, both for those ultimately awarded and denied benefits, the many stages of adjudication mean that the application for SSDI benefits can potentially take years.
Even if two applicants are identical in their application/appeals process, the wait time for a SSDI award also can vary substantially depending on where the disabled individuals live. looking not just at beneficiaries but all SSDI applicants. Using an unbalanced panel, they examine income sources three years before, at SSDI application, and three years after application, instead of just focusing on the year before benefit receipt. They find that earnings, and to a lesser extent total household income, drop dramatically six months prior to SSDI application, but rebound during the subsequent three-year period. In the early months following SSDI application, a patchwork of temporary disability benefits offset declines in SSDI applicants' own labor earnings. In the long run, most of these temporary sources of income decline and are replaced by SSDI benefits for successful applicants or earnings for denied applicants.
Although these studies shed light on how people might use other income sources as a coping strategy, it is unclear whether applicants for SSDI more and more rely on other coping strategies as they experience a longer waiting time, or whether they use other income sources to extend their waiting time, primarily be filing an appeal. Security data (they either disclose their Social Security Number or have a match based on name, birth date, and address so that they can be matched to 831 file) and who applied for SSDI while being surveyed by the SIPP. We also restrict our sample to individuals age 18 to 66 at the time of SSDI application. These restrictions result in a sample of 4,594 SSDI applicants, and 26,136
person-month observations.
Our sample respondents may have multiple disability applications in the years covered by the administrative data. We focus on the first application we observe in the administrative data to be sure we can observe income and its sources in the SIPP before and after application for SSDI benefits. While the vast majority (85.4 percent) of our sample contains complete information on the first application process, some cases are pending within the SIPP and thus we do not observe the entire application period. For these cases, while we are able to obtain the application duration and determination information from the administrative data, we do not have associated time-varying demographics, income amounts or sources, or information related to coping strategies for applications months that are not covered by the SIPP panel. Moreover, this right-censoring is more likely to affect individuals with longer application durations compared to individuals with shorter durations, as well as more recent (2008) panelists. If individuals with different application durations differ systematically in terms of both observable and unobservable characteristics, right-censoring may potentially create biases for our analysis. To address this issue, we run a sensitivity analyses on the subsample for which we observe the entire application period.
Descriptive Statistics. Table 1 presents averages for the socioeconomic characteristics of SSDI applicants measured at the month of application. The average age of applicants is 45, slightly more than half are male, and slightly more than three-quarters are white. Educational attainment is roughly evenly distributed between high school drop-outs, high school graduates, and those who have at least some college. Half of all applicants are married at the time of application. On average, household income of just over $3,000 per month supports almost three people. A quarter of applicants have worked in the month of application. Almost half of all applicants apply for both SSDI and SSI, suggesting that these applicants do have relatively strong attachment to the labor force -they have worked enough to be insured by SSDI -but remain low-income -their income and assets are low enough that they qualify for SSI benefits.
There are differences in demographic characteristics of our sample and that of Bound, Burkhauser, and Nichols (2003) . Our sample of SSDI applicants is more likely to be female and a high-school drop-out, and less likely to be married, and have larger household size but lower household income. These differences in samples can largely be explained by changes in applicants over time. Table 2 compares applicants of the 1990s to applicants of the 2000s. The starkest difference is the gender composition: 55 percent of applicants were male in the 1990s but only 47 percent are in the 2000s. This is likely due to the shift towards more labor market activity among women, which makes them relatively newly eligible for the SSDI program. The educational background of applicants has also changed significantly, with the proportion of applicants without a high school degree dropping from one-third to one-fifth, likely mirroring overall trends in education during this time period. Applicants in the 2000s are also less likely to be married, and while their monthly earnings and household incomes are similar, personal income is lower among the more recent applicants.
Overview of Coping Strategies
We examine the following strategies SSDI applicants use to fund consumption while waiting: (1) government transfers, including SNAP, UI, and workers' compensation; (2) earnings of the spouse; (3) changing living arrangement; (4) borrowing from credit cards; (5) liquidation of housing assets. Given the complexity of these programs, we briefly discuss rules and regulations that are relevant for this study and how eligibility for each coping strategy is determined. Table 3 summaries the use of each coping strategy at the time of application.
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The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. The SNAP is the largest nutrition program for low-income Americans and a mainstay of the federal safety net. To receive SNAP, households must meet three financial criteria: a gross-income test, a net-income test, and an asset test. A household is automatically or "categorically" eligible for SNAP through the receipt of SSI, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), or General Assistance benefits. SSI and SSDI benefits are part of gross household income. The amount of SNAP benefit that a household receives is equal to the maximum benefit level less 30 percent of the household's net income (reflecting the assumption that an average household will spend approximately 30 percent of its net income on food).
We determine SNAP eligibility accounting for gross and net income tests, the dependent, shelter, medical expenditure deductions, and categorical eligibility. But we ignore the asset eligibility test for three reasons. First, while the SIPP has information on assets, it comes from the special topical module of the SIPP, which is only asked infrequently (the maximum is once each year per panel with the timing varying substantially by SIPP panel). While the monthly asset information can be estimated using the linear extrapolation, the method does not reflect potential fluctuations of assets, a potentially large bias given the population we are studying. Second, the existing literature suggests that asset variables in the SIPP suffer from measurement error (Strand, Rupp, and Davies 2009) . Finally, the literature also suggests that income limits are much more likely to be binding than asset limits (e.g., Coe and Wu 2013) .
Overall, almost half of our sample is estimated to be eligible for SNAP at the time of application. As is typical in needs-based programs, take-up is relatively low at 32 percent (Table   3) .
Unemployment Insurance. UI is a federal-state partnership providing short-term cash benefits to individuals who lose their jobs through no fault of their own, i.e. either involuntarily or voluntarily with a good cause (e.g. due to illness). Unemployed workers are eligible for UI benefits if they fulfill all monetary and non-monetary requirements. Monetary entitlement requires sufficiently high wage earnings during the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters before the worker files a claim. Non-monetary eligibility criteria concern both the reason for job separation and ongoing claims. Weekly UI benefit formulas specify a minimum and a maximum benefit amount as well as a percentage within these boundaries. The duration of benefits is either set at a fixed level for all UI recipients (nine states), or depends on the total amount of benefits unemployed workers can receive during their eligibility period.
We determine UI eligibility based on monetary eligibility alone, because we cannot infer the reasons for a job separation from the survey. This leads to a relatively high estimate: 58 percent in our sample are eligible for UI at the time of application. Due to the mismeasurement in eligibility and the small overlap between SSDI applicants and UI claimants (Lindner 2011), we find a low take up rate of under 7 percent. Delaying SSDI applications until UI benefits expire might also account for this low take-up rate (Rutledge 2012 application. This is a much higher mover rate than the average mover rate.
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Spousal Insurance. The interaction of couple's labor supply has been widely discussed in the literature (Heckman 1974 , for example). Couples can self-insure through intra-family labor market substitution; i.e., if one person cannot work, the other spouse can enter the labor market. This is often referred to as the added-worker effect. We measure this strategy by examining: 1) changes in marital status; 2) employment and changes in employment of the spouse; 3) earnings and changes in earnings of the spouse. At the time of application, over 60 percent of spouses are working, and the average earnings among employed spouses are $2,775 per month.
Borrowing from Credit Cards. An SSDI applicant can also borrow from credit cards to fund consumption while their application is pending. Overall, 17 percent of SSDI applicants have an outstanding balance from credit cards in the month of application, which is lower than the 20 percent for the overall SIPP sample of the same age (t=6.5). Among applicants with a credit card balance, the average balance is $3,451 and the median is $1,421.
Liquidation of Housing Assets. SSDI applicants who own a home could also can partially or fully liquidate housing assets to support the consumption. Unfortunately, only information on home ownership is available from the SIPP; therefore, we will not be able to measure partial liquidation, such as borrowing from home equity line of credit. About 61 percent of the sample own a house 12 months prior to application, and only 59 percent at the time of application are home owners.
The Use of Coping Strategies at Application Onset, and before and after Application
The average application duration is over 6 months, or approximately 200 days, but wait times are quite skewed to the left, as depicted by Figure 1 . Specifically, the 25 th percentile is 60 days, the median wait time is 101 days, and the 75 th percentile is 152 days. The right tail is also quite long, with 12 percent of the sample waiting at least one year, and 5 percent of the sample waiting more than two years. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics at the month of application by actual application duration. SSDI applicants with less than 3 months of wait-time are more likely to be male or whites and less likely to be divorced, while those who wait longer than 6 months are more likely to be single. There are a few characteristics that show a U-shaped pattern -there is a decreasing trend between no wait and up to 12 months of wait-time, but then reversing the trend among those who wait longer than 12 months before their final determination. For example, the average income is $1,116 per month for applicants whose case is determined within the first three months of applications. Average income slowly decreases as the wait time increases, to $846 per month for those waiting between 6-12 months. However, among those whose case takes longer than 12 months to decide, their income is back up to over $1,000 per month. This same pattern holds for employment, earnings and income at both the personal and household level, as well as percent married. We also find that joint SSDI/SSI application exhibits an inverse U-shaped pattern:
about 46 percent for applications who wait less than 3 months; the fraction peaks at 54 percent for those waiting between 4-6 months, then declines to 41 percent among those wait for more than 12 months.
Much like with demographics, the correlations between using a certain coping strategy at the month of application and the wait time is not monotonic (Table 4) . SSDI applicants who wait for longer than 6 months are less likely to take-up UI benefits, but more likely to receive workers' compensation. While both spousal employment and home ownership show a U-shaped pattern with the waiting duration, the share borrowing from credit cards and changing address exhibit an inverse U-shape.
Although we cannot detect much of a relationship between the initial use of coping strategies and the overall wait time, it is quite possible that the use of certain coping strategies changes as time since application progresses. We next explore how applicants use coping strategies in the months before and after their SSDI application.
Specifically, we examine changes in household income and coping strategies of our sample across seven distinct periods related to the timing of the SSDI application, ranging from 20 months before application to 20 months after application (Table 5 ). The first is between 18
and 20 months before application. We use this period to approximate the economic status of SSDI applicants before the onset of disability began to affect various outcomes. The last period is 18-20 months after application. We use this period to approximate the status of applicants after the full application process has been completed. At this point for most applicants, either benefits have begun or respondents have learned that benefits will not be awarded and have had the opportunity to try to return to work. Employment also continues to decline over time, but never goes to zero; 16 percent of the applicants are still employed 18-20 months after they apply for the disability program. Earnings decline over time as well; individual earnings declining the most (primarily because of the drop in employment), whereas household earnings and household income drop less severely.
Along with this decrease in earnings and income comes an increase in eligibility for needs-based assistance; the take-up rate of SNAP among the eligible also increases over time (Figure 3) . Unemployment insurance has a humped-shape over time, with more eligible people receiving UI benefits between 10 months prior and their application, then decreasing over time as their application is reviewed and possibly UI benefits expire. Worker's compensation shows the opposite pattern, with the number of applicants receiving benefits increasing over time.
While not shown in the figures, we also find that home ownership declines, suggesting SSDI applicants could be using housing assets to support their consumption. In addition, the probability of changing address decreases over time. While applicants may borrow from credit cards to fund consumption while waiting, there is no significant correlation between borrowing from other financial resources and waiting time.
Empirical Methods
The descriptive analysis above illustrates some interesting correlations between the wait time, demographics, and the use of certain coping strategies. However, the pattern may be confounded by the issue of selection, on either observable or unobservable characteristics. To explore whether and extent to which the length of wait time and other factors relate to certain coping strategies, we first estimate equations of the following form:
where measures each of the five coping strategies indicated above, controlling for the actual total wait time ( ), and individual characteristics such as age, race, education, gender, marital status, and family structure (X it ).
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We also control for secular and short-term changes in program participation and family structure by including a set of year indicator variables ( t γ ). We include a set of state dummies ( t S ) because the wait time for a SSDI award These regressions shed light on the association between various coping strategies and applicants' waiting times, but they cannot address how people change their coping strategies as they face longer waiting times. For instance, research has demonstrated that a lack of information contributes to welfare program nonparticipation among eligibles (Coe 1983 , Blaylock and Smallwood 1984 , Hill 1990 , Daponte et al. 1999 , Wu 2009 ). Those who are eligible but do not take-up SNAP may also not appeal an initial SSDI denial due to the unfamiliarity of the program rules, which results in a shorter waiting time. To understand better how people change their coping strategies over the course of their waiting time, we next regress the use of a coping strategy on time since application, using waiting time fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity between people with a shorter versus longer overall waiting time.
Our regression equation is written as follows:
where we analyze as a function of time since application ( ), controlling for total application time (AW i ). By adding total application duration fixed effects to the model, this approach explores the changes in the use of coping strategies since application given the length of the overall application duration.
This type of regression controls for heterogeneity in the use of coping strategies related to the overall waiting time, but it cannot distinguish between applicants reacting to a exogenously longer waiting time (e.g., because of fewer case workers) and applicants using a coping strategy to file an appeal, which increases their chance of being admitted into the program but also their overall waiting time. For instance, applicants with a spouse who can increase his or her work time and thereby contribute more to household income may be more inclined to appeal an initial denial. To address such endogeneity concerns, we employ an instrumental variable approach. The first stage estimates the effect of state-year-stage average wait time on the individual actual waiting time:
where is average state-year-stage wait time. As before, we include state and year fixedeffects in this regression.
In the second stage, the predicted value of individual waiting time from the first stage is substituted for actual waiting time.
where � is the predicted waiting time. Because we include year and state fixed effects as well, identification is from within-state variation in the waiting time that does not reflect common changes across all states in a given year, for instance dues to business cycle conditions. The exclusion restriction requires such changes to be uncorrelated with other factors that affect the use of coping strategies. We believe that this assumption is justified because the identifying variation primarily comes from changes in the number of staff reviewing applications and fluctuations in the number of applications from year to year that are not common across all states. Table 6 summarizes regression results using an unbalanced sample, which includes both completed and right-censored observations. 13 Column (1) and (3) presents regression coefficients of linear probability models estimating equation (1) for the two regressions: month of application and all months of application. Column (2) and (4) presents IV results from equations (3) and (4) for month of application and all months of application, respectively. Even if instruments are relevant, they might be weak. In that case, instrumental variable estimates may be inconsistent and imprecisely measured. Therefore, 13 The detailed regression results on each coping strategy using unbalanced sample are summarized in the Appendix. We explore the potential for right censoring biasing our results in robustness tests (Table 7) . instrument is zero. Column (5) report results regression results estimating equation (2) for regression of months since application.
How Is Application Duration Related to the Use of Coping Strategies?
Each row of the table presents different regression results for each coping strategy separately. Because measured eligibility for SNAP and UI may contain error, we also estimate unconditional recipiency of SNAP and UI. Coefficients for binary variables are expressed as percentages. Table 6 presents the results from 65 (13 coping strategies x 5 estimation models) separate regression models.
With few exceptions, the association between using a coping strategy at the time of application and total application duration is largely absent (Table 6 , Column 1). The one exception is being married: a one month longer application duration is associated with an almost 0.15 percent higher probability of being married. However, those who are married are not more likely to have a working spouse or higher income through the spouse. To the contrary, the coefficients for spousal employment and spousal earnings are negative and imprecisely measured. While SNAP recipiency is positively related to a longer application duration though not significantly different from zero, other coping strategies such as UI take-up and worker's compensation recipiency are negative, but insignificant and small. The lack of associations between any initial coping strategy and the final wait time suggests that applicants do not differ systematically in their initial use of coping strategies. The third column shows OLS results for all application months. We find that longer wait times are negatively associated with UI and worker's compensation benefit recipiency, but positively correlated with home ownership probability.
We then present results for the likelihood of using a coping strategy as a function of time since application, controlling for the overall application duration (Table 6 , Column 5). We find that being married is positively associated with total application duration at the month of application, but is uncorrelated with the time since application, suggesting that being married is a precondition for people being able to sustain a longer application duration, and, not surprisingly, applicants do not get married in order to sustain their application. The role of a working spouse is further corroborated by the positive and significant coefficient for spousal employment. This suggests an added worker effect: as applicants remain out of the labor market for a longer time, their spouse starts working to balance lost household income. An alternative interpretation of the coefficient could be that individuals with an initially denied application whose spouse finds employment decide to prolong their application by filing an appeal. The coefficient implies that a three-month longer time since application is associated with about a one percent higher employment rate of a spouse. We revisit the interpretation of this coefficient when we discuss the instrumental variables estimation results.
The positive association between spousal employment and time since application also implies a positive association between spousal earnings and time since application, but the coefficient is not precisely estimated. We do not find significant differences for spousal earnings conditional on employment, suggesting that newly working spouses have similar earnings than those already working.
Turning to other income sources, one can see that both SNAP recipiency and take-up conditional on eligibility are positively related to a longer time since application. As with spousal employment, these coefficients are consistent with two interpretations. First, applicants increase take-up as the application goes on, or second, initially rejected applicants decide to file an appeal if they can draw from these income sources. Interestingly, for UI take-up and worker's compensation receipt, we observe negative coefficients, likely because people lose eligibility for these programs over time.
The last two significant coefficients concern where applicants live. The negative coefficient for a change in address suggests that applicants hold off relocating while they are in the midst of their SSDI application. However, homeowners -a majority (58 percent) of applicants -do seem more likely to sell their home as their application duration increases. These two findings seem contradictory. One way to reconcile these differences is that homeowners tap into their home equity to fund consumption during the application process, but renters do not move, perhaps because the money saved in monthly rent is not enough to justify the fixed costs of moving.
The IV estimates of the relationship between using a coping strategy at the time of application/all months of application and total application duration are summarized in Column 2
and Column 4 respectively. The first stage results show that the instrument tends to have the expected sign and is statistically significant -that is, average state-year-stage waiting time are positively correlated to individual actual waiting time. For instance, in the regression for spousal employment, a one month increase in average state-year-stage waiting time is predicted to increase individual actual waiting time by 3.4 months. The first stage results also show that the instrumental variable is strong with F-statistics over 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997) .
The IV results put the findings from the last specification in perspective. First, they corroborate the positive relationship between the wait time and SNAP recipiency and the negative relationship between the wait time and an address change (when all months are considered). Second, IV coefficients for spousal employment are negative and insignificant, in contrast to the positive and significant coefficient for the time since application specification.
These results together suggest that the association between spousal employment and the wait time is due to reverse causality: a higher spousal employment leads to a longer wait time because applicants can more easily appeal an initial denial when their spouse works. Such a relationship between the wait time and spousal employment is captured by the OLS regression but not by the IV regression. Third, for UI and worker's compensation, coefficients of the IV regressions are negative as coefficients of the time since application regression, but insignificant. For these coping strategies, a reverse causality explanation in combination with negative effects does not seem plausible, so the lack of significance for the IV coefficients mostly reflect larger standard errors for IV regressions. Demographic characteristics are correlated with the use of a certain coping strategy as one would expect (see Appendix). For example, age is negatively correlated with using need-based programs and changing address, but positively correlated with homeownership and probability of being married. Minority, low-educated, female applicants, and those with children in the household are more likely to use need-based transfers to fund their consumption. Husbands of applicants are more likely to increase their employment as well as earnings during the application process than wives of applicants. College-educated applicants see the largest increase in spousal earnings, which could reflect assortive mating and a positive association in the market wages between spouses or the lower replacement rate SSDI benefits among higher earning households. Further, higher education is associated with more borrowing from credit cards, which likely reveals easier access to this channel of funding consumption after a disability onset.
By estimating these relationships for an unbalanced sample, we allow individuals with potentially very long wait times to influence the results. However, since the wait time is, at least to some extent, endogenous due to the decision to appeal, and applicants with a longer application duration are more likely to have some non-observed application months due to right-censoring which may potentially create biases, we test the robustness of our results by estimating these relationships on a balanced panel. This limits our sample to applicants who have a final decision on their application filed during the SIPP panel, and cuts our sample size by 15 percent.
Despite these cuts and the endogeneity concern, our findings are largely consistent between samples (see Table 7 ). Interestingly, the IV coefficient for UI recipiency (using all months of application) is significant for this sample, which seems very plausible: applicants use UI benefits as a coping strategy as long as they qualify for them.
Finally, as our descriptive statistics show that applicants of the 1990s are significantly different from applicants of the 2000s, we also explore an interaction model with the period dummy interacting with the waiting duration. We find that compared to applicants of the1990s, applicants with longer wait-time of the 2000s are increasingly more likely to use SNAP and UI benefits to fund consumptions while waiting for SSDI benefits, and less likely to use worker's compensation, sell the house, or borrow from credit cards.
Conclusion
Our analysis shows, while the relationship between the wait time and any particular initial or average coping strategies is largely absent, applicants with longer waiting durations are more likely to use SNAP benefits both as an initial and average coping strategy, and less likely to change one's address to cope over the duration of the application. When we focus on the time since application, we find that in addition to an increased probability of using SNAP and a decreased likelihood of changing one's address, there is a negative relationship between the time since application and receipt of UI, worker's compensation, as well as the probability of owning a house, and a positive relationship between the time since application and spousal employment.
Our IV results underline that applicants react to an exogenous increase in the waiting time by increasingly turning to SNAP, a means tested income source with relatively small benefits, as more generous income sources such as UI benefits dwindle. For spousal employment, an increase in the waiting time does not appear to increase the likelihood that an applicant's spouse seeks work. Rather, our IV results in combination with our OLS results for time since application suggest that an increase in spousal employment leads to a longer waiting time, presumably because applicants find it easier to appeal an initial denial.
Our study provides a first and important step to better understanding how the application duration impacts the use of various coping strategies. The findings of the interaction between SSDI and other government programs suggest that a reallocation of funds to decrease SSDI wait may also decrease outlays for the SNAP. 
